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THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: FOOD AND ENERGY RESOURCES
BERNARD H. OXMAN

I would like to thank the sponsors of the International Development Conference for inviting me to speak to you today.
While I have served on the United States delegation to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea for many years, and
in the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations as its vice chairman, I
am here today in my capacity as a professor of law.1 It is in that
capacity that I claim the privilege both to lecture and to stray a bit
from conventional wisdom. I do so at the outset.
2
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was not called to promote development among developing countries.
The rhetoric to the effect that this is the primary purpose of the
Conference has served to confuse representatives and the public in
both developing countries and industrialized countries. It has been the
source of unreasonable expectations regarding the Conference and of
3
unreasonable criticism of the Draft Convention.

The origins of the international law of the sea are inextricably

connected with the origins of modern international law itself. The
function of the international law of the sea is constitutional: it creates
the basic system of order in the oceans. It is primarily concerned with
1. Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; Vice Chairman,
United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. The following is the text of an address given to the International Development
Conference, Washington, D.C., May 13, 1981. The views expressed herein are those
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or
the U.S. Government.
2. The Conference commenced in 1973 pursuant to UNGA Res. 3067 (XXVIII).
The author's articles tracing the work of the Conference may be found in Stevenson
and Oxman, The PreparationsJor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J. INT'L L.
1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974
Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); The 1975 Geneva Session 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 763 (1975); and Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1977); The 1977 New
York Sessions, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); The Seventh Session (1978), 73 Am. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1979); The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980); The Ninth
Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211 (1981).
3. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doe. A/
Conf.62/WP.10/Rev. 3/Add.1 (1980). [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention] The
text was subsequently reissued with primarily drafting changes as A-Conf.62/L.78
(1981).
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allocating rights to use the oceans, and rights to insist that one's
interests be taken duly into account in the exercise of rights by others.
The purpose of this allocation is to reduce the changes of conflict
between states over ocean uses. This is done by narrowing the situations in which conflicting assertions of right may occur, and by channeling those conflicting assertions of right that do occur into more
manageable legal and technical contexts.
The international law of the sea is therefore concerned with the
maintenance of the prerequisites for all fruitful human activity, including economic activity: the promotion of peace, public order, and
reasonable stability of expectations.
It is in this sense that I would be happy to contradict my opening
assertion about the relationship between development and the law of
the sea: the less the uncertainty about public order and the stability of
expectations in the oceans, the less such uncertainty is a disincentive to
investment or a source of demands for higher rates of return that can
create both economic and political problems.
If the reasons for allocating rights are to promote peace, public
order, and reasonable stability of expectations, then we must define
what we mean by "rights" in light of those goals. It will not do to
speak of God-given rights that may be contested by others, perhaps
even violently. However divine the source for the assertion of rights,
however eminent the authorities defending that assertion, however
just or efficient the purported ends, if the assertion is not accepted by
others, then there are no rights in the functional sense that we mean
here: namely the acquiescence by others in the legitimacy of the
activity in question.
The key words here are "others" and "acquiescence." Which
"others" do we mean? Given the underlying purpose of achieving the
acquiescence, by "others" we mean those states in a position to disrupt
the desired stability of expectations by military, economic, or political
means.
By "acquiescence" we mean a decision to accept the assertion of a
right without military, economic, or political challenge, even though
the acquiescent state might prefer that the underlying right in question not exist or that its specific exercise be avoided.
Like much of the rest of modern international law, the international law of the sea evolved largely in unwritten form. 4 This is
4. The law of the sea was generally customary international law until it was
codified and developed by the International Law Commission in a major undertak-
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referred to by the term customary international law: a term used by
international lawyers to distinguish it from international law in written form. The source of customary international law is the custom and
practice of states.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with relying on unwritten
rules. Most of the norms of behavior which guide us in our everyday
lives-whether we call them law or not-are unwritten in form. Most
of the promises that we make to each other in the course of our
everyday lives are unwritten.
One difficulty, however, is that as the size of the community and
the scope of the problems involved increase in variety and complexity,
the demands for definitive and authoritative statements of the law
increase. This "written" law can be in the form of international
resolutions or judicial decisions interpreting what the customary law
is, assuming those resolutions or judicial decisions are in fact accepted
as having legislative effect. It can also be in the form of direct written
statements of the law: in national terms "legislation," in international
terms so-called "law-making treaties."
At the present stage, resort to the International Court of Justice
for the settlement of disputes between states is rare. Moreover, judicial decisions are not accepted as authoritative statements of international law in the sense that decisions of American courts on common
law issues are regarded as binding precedent. 5 The extent to which
resolutions are accepted as accurate statements of customary law
depends on a case-by-case analysis that frequently turns itself on an
analysis of custom and practice.
Thus, in the 20th century, the so-called law-making treaty has
increasingly been resorted to as the way of bringing greater stability of
expectations to the international law in an expanded and far more
complex international community of states.
It is important to bear in mind that the historical function of the
conference called to negotiate a law-making treaty is to increase the
ing culminating in the first United Nations Conference on the LaW of the Sea in
1958. Four conventions emerged from that Conference: (1) Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499, U.N.T.S. 311; (2) Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205; (3) Convention on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; (4) Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
5. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993,
3 Bevans 1179 art. 59: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
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efficiency and certainty of the law-making process. To put it into
different terms, the conference brings together all of those "others"
that I described in order to reach a common decision on what they
will "acquiesce" in. Needless to say, the question of which states form
the relevant group depends upon the issue.
If, for example, one is speaking of transit of straits, it would seem
that the relevant group would consist primarily of the states bordering
major straits and the major users of the straits (bearing in mind that
most states are at least indirect users). Each of the states would,
because of its underlying interest, presumably have the will, and
because of its underlying position, presumably have the ability to
upset the stability of expectations regarding transit of straits if it chose
to do so. Similarly, if the written law embodied in a treaty is to create
rights in the sense that we mean them here-that is promote peace,
public order and stability of expectations-then these states must, by
and large, also accept the resulting treaty if those goals are to be
achieved by treaty (or at least accept the relevant written rules as a
definitive statement of customary law).
A multilateral conference like the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea assembles all of the states of the world to
discuss all of the major issues of allocation of rights regarding almost
all ocean uses. This creates the temptation to regard the assembled
participants as representatives of all mankind dispatched to enunciate
global community policy on its behalf, rather than as instructed negotiating agents of states. The result is a rhetorical pressure to cast issues
in terms of global community values, and especially in terms of the
interests of the numerical majority, to a degree that far exceeds the
actual weight accorded such considerations by almost all national
governments in their individual formulation of policy.
The result can be good. For example, in controlling pollution or
disease, the effect is to expose both the necessity for, and the possibility of, effective action on a global level. But the rhetorical pressure to
submerge national interests in the face of asserted community objectives can also greatly magnify the influence of those who have little at
stake in the resolution of a particular issue or would not be in a
position to affect the underlying stability of expectations outside the
context of a multilateral conference. Up to a point, this too can be a
good thing, since it ensures that more voices are heard. But, if it
diverts a conference from its primary function of serving as a forum
for working out more efficiently the norms acceptable to those who
are principally affected, then the resulting document will not define
rights in the sense that we are using the term here.
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It is against this background that one should examine the major
development in the law of the sea since World War II. That development entails the removal of most of the living resources of the sea and
most of known oil and gas resources of the seabed from the high seas
regime-that is from the "commons" as it were-and their allocation
to the adjacent coastal states." This process was begun in 1945 when
the United States claimed exclusive control over the resources of the
seabed of the continental shelf adjacent to the United States outside its
three-mile territorial sea, and was rapidly emulated.' It was continued as Latin American countries claimed various types of jurisdiction
in 200-mile zones adjacent to their coast, a trend that gradually
spread to other parts of the world.
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held
in 1958 in Geneva, confirmed this trend with respect to seabed resources of the continental shelf, but was vague as to precisely how
much of the seabed was involved in this allocation of resources to the
coastal state, and took an exceedingly conservative approach to the
question of extending coastal state rights over living resources. Thus,
one thing that was lacking was sufficient precision with respect to the
outer limit of coastal state control over seabed resources, a question
which became increasingly relevant to stability of expectations as it
became technologically possible to develop seabed resources in deeper
and deeper areas further from shore.8 The second difficulty was that
the approach to fisheries resources taken at that conference did not
respond to the growing demands of coastal states for control over
fisheries in vast areas adjacent to their coasts. 9 This was one of the
principal reasons why the 1958 conventions never achieved universal
ratification.
6. At the end of 1972, some 400 drilling units were operating on the continental
shelves of 70 countries, 26 of which were involved in commercial production. Berrybill, The World Wide Search for Petroleum Offshore-A Status Report for the
Quarter Century, 1947-1972, U.S. Dept. of Interior (1974) 1-4, 20.
7. President Truman made this claim in what has come to be known as the
Truman Proclamation. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation),
13 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
8. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 4, art. 1, provides:
For the purpose of these articles the term "continental shelf" is used as
referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters
or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the areas; (b) to the seabed
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
9. The fisheries concept was left to state practice. The International Court of
Justice noted:
Two concepts have crystallized as customary law in recent years
arising out of the general consensus revealed at [the Second U.N. Confer-
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By contrast, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea-functioning by consensus-has developed texts that fully
reflect, and refine with a degree of precision never before attained,
the trend toward reallocating most fisheries and hydrocarbon resources to adjacent coastal states.' 0 While establishing a maximum
permissible breadth of twelve nautical miles for the territorial sea,"
the draft convention produced by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea achieves this reallocation by the use of two
regimes: the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
Taking the latter first, the Conference confirmed the pre-existing
continental shelf regime,' 2 pursuant to which the coastal state exercises exclusive sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil of the continental
shelf. 3 What the Draft Convention adds is a new precise outer limit
which is set at the edge of the continental margin, with elaborate
4
substantive and procedural provisions on how to locate the edge.1
The continental margin is a vast area extending seaward from the
coast in many parts of the world-in some areas extending six, seven
or eight hundred miles from the coast. In other places there is a very
narrow continental margin. To deal with those situations, it is specified that at all events the continental shelf regime covers the seabed to
a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coast if the continental shelf
margin does not extend as far seaward as that 200-mile limit.' 5
Another thing added by the Draft Convention in this regard is
the idea that there would be minimum internationally established
environmental standards for the development of the resources of the
continental shelf which coastal states would have to observe, assuming
they did not wish to establish higher standards for such activities.'

6

ence on the Law of the Sea]. The first is the concept of the fishery zone,
the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a
12-mile limit from the baselines, appears now to be generally accepted.

Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 23.
10. Draft Convention, arts. 2, 3, 47, 49, 56, 57, 61, 62, 66, 67, 76, 77, 121. See

also art. 142.
11. Draft Convention, art. 3.
12. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases [1969] I.C.J. 3; Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Pres. Proc. No.
2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), 13 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
13. Draft Convention, art. 77.

14. Draft Convention, art. 76, Annex II.
15. Draft Convention, art. 76 (1).
16. Draft Convention, arts. 208, 214; see arts. 192-206, 286, 297(1).
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While the environmental reasons for taking such a step are clear,
important economic reasons were also involved:
A. Pollution resulting from oil drilling off the coast of one country can be carried by winds and currents to other areas, thereby
damaging the economic interests of another country in such uses as
tourism, recreation, and fishing.
B. Publicity regarding pollution resulting from oil or gas drilling
off the coast of one country can increase public resistance to the
development of oil and gas resources of the continental shelf off other
countries.
C. Offshore oil drilling is a global industry that can clearly
achieve certain economies as a result of standardization of requirements regarding design and construction of equipment and even its
on-site operation.
Some ninety percent of the world's fishing takes place within 200
miles of the coast of some country. Therefore, the effect of the establishment of a 200-mile economic zone is to replace the previous regime
of freedom of fishing on the high seas by a regime of coastal state
control.' 7 The Draft Convention introduces three new elements in
this regime for fisheries:
A. It contains sophisticated provisions regarding the management of migrating fish stocks that pay no heed to the allocative
boundaries drawn by man in the sea, in some cases differentiating
between species of fish. 8
B. It requires states to establish conservation measures for fish
stocks, including the establishment of an allowable catch, with a view
to maintaining an optimum yield from fish stocks over time.' 9

17. Note 10, supra. The drive to extend coastal state jurisdiction came initially
from Latin American states. With respect to the seabeds, those with broad margins
have been reasonably content with their rights under the Convention on the Continental Shelf, especially with interpretations that would give them the resources of the
entire shelf, slope and rise out to the ocean abyss. Some states, having little continental margin, have asked "compensation" in the form of rights in the deep sea bed for
many miles from their shores. Principally, however, these states have pressed for a
monopoly over fisheries equivalent to that enjoyed over coastal minerals. Within the
general campaign of the poorer states for change in the international economic
system and its law, and the general re-examination of the law of the sea, mining and
fishing states in Latin America joined to propose a "patrimonial sea" of 200 miles in
which the coastal state would have exclusive rights of all resources. See Henkin,
Politics and the Changing Law oJ the Sea, 89 POL. Sci. Q. 56-57. (1974).
18. Draft Convention, arts. 63-68.
19. Draft Convention, art. 61.
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C. Coastal states are required to ensure the optimum utilization
of fish stocks in their zone, so that if the fishermen of the coastal state
are not for the time being able to take the full allowable catch of
access
particular stocks, the coastal state must allow foreign fishermen
20
to those stocks under reasonable terms and conditions.
The duty of optimum utilization is a particularly interesting
innovation from the perspective of food and resource policy. In effect,
it is a prohibition on substantial under-utilization of a renewable
resource, so long as there is a market for the resource.
The duty is a response to the recognition that there are frequently
a variety of political pressures on states not to permit foreign exploitation of fisheries resources off their coasts despite the fact that they gain
nothing by allowing those resources to go to waste. The duty of
optimum utilization reduces this political restraint on the normal
operation of economic forces; while the coastal state may establish
reasonable conditions of access to the living resources surplus to its
immediate needs (e.g. conservation restrictions and economic rent),
and while those conditions may of course increase the cost of extraction of the living resources in question, it may not completely prohibit
their extraction.
The duty of optimum utilization therefore responds at the same
time to a global interest of ensuring the maximum feasible supply of
animal protein from the sea consistent with sound conservation prac-

tices, as well as the more immediate interest of distant water fishing
states in preserving some access to fisheries resources that fall under
the jurisdiction of various coastal states.
I should interject here that the duty of optimum utilization does
not apply to marine mammals. 21 The convention would expressly
permit the imposition of stricter limitations on hunting for marine
mammals than are required by its conservation provisions, including
total prohibitions, irrespective of whether those limitations are necessary for the maintenance of an optimum yield. I mention this in part

because it is one of the rare instances in which ethical considerations
have played such a prominent substantive part in a highly politicized
global negotiation.
It is important to bear in mind that the pressure for extension of

coastal state control over ocean resources was not confined to developing countries. With respect to seabed resources, it originated in the
20. Draft Convention, art. 62.
21. Draft Convention, art. 65.
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United States. With respect to fisheries, it originated in South American countries that are not among the poorest of the developing countries. Among the advocates of broad coastal state control over seabed
resources or fisheries resources, or both, at the Conference were such
countries as Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
Nevertheless, the rhetorical technique used by the Latin American states to pursuade their colleagues in Asia and Africa of the merits
of broad coastal state jurisdiction was that such extensions of jurisdiction would prove of net benefit to developing countries generally. The
argument was that under a high seas regime, the exploitation of
resources would be dominated by the fishing fleets and mining companies of the developed world. Broad coastal state jurisdiction would
permit developing coastal states to: (a) protect local fishermen from
foreign competition; (b) prohibit or restrict development of resources
until there can be greater participation by coastal state nationals in
the extraction or downstream economic exploitation of those resources; and (c) collect economic rent for the privilege of exploiting
such resources in the form of cash or training and technology transfer.
The effort therefore is to achieve a re-allocation of wealth to the
coastal state that presumably would not otherwise result from the
operation of market forces. Whether one believes that such forced
re-allocation will in the end prove beneficial to the economies of
developing countries as a whole depends to some degree on one's
economic philosophy. One of the things which is so interesting about
the current debate regarding the law of the sea is that those who assert
that the primary criterion for measuring a regime for deep seabed
manganese nodules is the avoidance of artificial restraint on the development of those resources and their distribution in response to market
forces have paid little attention to the fact that a primary motive for
the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the much more valuable
resources of the economic zone and the continental shelf is to impose
such artifical restraints. I will do no more than note that a significant
proportion of OPEC production comes from the offshore continental
shelf of OPEC members.
Certainly from the perspective of a coastal state that has major
fisheries or oil resources in the areas of its coast, it is difficult to refute
the proposition that its assumption of control over those resources can
make a significant contribution to its economic development that
would not otherwise occur. And there are certainly those who would
argue vigorously that the governments of various coastal states-even
those where investment conditions are very unstable-can supply
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greater incentives to economic investment than would otherwise be
the case.
In assessing the impact of these regimes on developing countries
one must consider the fact that there are significant numbers of developing countries that are land-locked or that will not acquire control
over significant living resources or oil and gas resources off their coasts
by virtue of broad extensions of coastal state jurisdiction in general.
That problem of geography is of course not unique to developing
countries. At the conference a group of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States-numbering over fifty-was formed in an
attempt to protect their interests in a situation in which there was
dominant pressure for a massive re-allocation of control over resources
to coastal states.
As one might expect, it was at this point that the rhetoric of
community goals and promotion of developing countries' interests in
general broke down. They gave way to assertions by both developing
and developed coastal states that there were very stringent limits on
the concessions they were prepared to make in a treaty to the LandLocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States, since the coastal
states could achieve many-although perhaps not all-of the advantages of the resource re-allocation without a treaty and without such
concessions. Two concessions however were made:
A. Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states enjoy a
priority of access to surplus
living resources of the economic zones of
22
their coastal neighbors.
B. Coastal states must pay a certain percentage of the value of
production of hydrocarbons from the continental margin in areas
seaward of 200 miles into an international fund to be used for the
benefit of developing states parties to the Law of the Sea Conven23
tion.
For those interested in finding new sources and approaches to
fund international development efforts, and thereby to alleviate the
heavy dependence on the United States, the idea of sharing revenues
from development of mineral resources of the continental margin
seaward of 200 miles could prove to be an interesting experiment.
Moreover, giving developing countries generally some stake in the.
profits generated by development of hydrocarbon resources of the
continental margin beyond 200 miles could help produce an atmo22. Draft Convention, arts. 69-72.
23. Draft Convention, art. 82.
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sphere around the world more conducive to early efficient production
of such resources.
I have deliberately avoided, until now, any discussion of the most
controversial aspect of the law of the sea negotiations, namely the
exploitation of the manganese nodules of the deep seabeds, that is the
so-called International Seabed Area that is seaward of 200 miles of the
outer edge of the continental margin.
The reason is that while the deep seabed mining negotiations
have produced sharp philosophical differences of approach and principle between industrialized countries and developing countries, and
the only militant and unified approaches by the Group of 77 at the
Conference, the mining of the deep seabeds is, at least for the remainder of this century and the beginning of the next, of little if any
importance to the overall question of development in the developing
world.
Seen in context, the deep seabed manganese nodule negotiations
are almost the obverse of the negotiations regarding the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone. When ideological questions of
sharing on a global basis for the overall benefit of the international
community, and of installing strong regional or international organizational controls, were raised in connection with economic zone or
continental shelf resources, the large number of developing coastal
states seeking unfettered control over their slice of the pie resisted such
appeals. With respect to deep seabed mining, however, the number of
states that perceive a direct interest is quite small. Therefore the
rhetorical appeal to community interest in general, and abstract developing country interest in particular has considerable effect.
This has produced distortions of perception that have continuously reduced, and continue to reduce, the possibility that a broadly
acceptable treaty can be produced. These distortions are the source of
many of the concerns being addressed in the current review of the
Draft Convention by the U.S. Administration.
This leads me to a conclusion which may have some bearing on
other approaches to issues of development. The achievement of near
consensus on food and energy issues, and on a number of military,
communications, and environmental issues of great significance as
well, at a global conference of over 150 states functioning by consensus-while the same conference remains in danger of collapse over
the issue of deep seabed manganese nodules-would seem to suggest
that multilateral negotiations are more likely to succeed when the
immediate stakes are high and are fairly widely distributed.-

168
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One could almost draw a certain analogy between the distorting
effects of the multilateral negotiating process and the threshold buzz
in a home radio receiver. The stronger the incoming signal-the
stronger the underlying national interests being dealt with-the less
troublesome or more tangible the buzz will be.
I do not make this analogy to the buzz in the radio receiver
because I believe it is either desirable or appropriate to dismiss considerations of community interest in the development of international
law. Nothing could be further from the truth. My concern with the
effectiveness of the global multilateral process derives primarily from
my belief that it is an important way to ensure that real community
interests are recognized and reflected in the law. But I would suggest
that multilateral decisions that result from careful consideration by,
and dialogue between those who are principally affected-including
by all means consideration of common interests-are more likely to
become sound and acceptable norms of behavior than decisions that
emerge largely from the rhetorical imperatives of multilateral bodies.

